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ii ABSTRACT 
Merger Control in the New Economy* 
by Lars-Hendrik Röller and Christian Wey 
This paper addresses the potential for conflict between antitrust authorities in the arena 
of merger control in the new economy. By “new economy” we mean two related 
developments. First, the internationalization of the economy, i.e. the ability to sell and 
produce products world-wide, and secondly, markets with certain characteristics such as 
network effects and other aspects of natural monopoly. We focus on three types of 
substantive issues in merger control - market definition, assessment of competitive 
effects, and the role of remedies. We argue that the scope for conflict varies 
significantly across these three arenas. In particular, conflict over market definition is 
less likely. By contrast, the assessment of competitive effects and the role of remedies 
are areas where conflict between antitrust authorities may be more likely in “new 
economy- type” markets. 
 
Keywords: Merger, New Economy, Competition Policy, International Conflict 
JEL Classification: L1, L4 
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would like to thank Damien Neven for comments. Any remaining errors are our own.. 
iii  
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Fusionskontrolle in der New Ecomomy 
Diese Arbeit identifiziert Konfliktpotentiale zwischen Wettbewerbsbehörden in der 
Fusionskontrolle von New Economy-Fällen. Mit „New Economy“ bezeichnen wir zwei 
miteinander verbundene Entwicklungen: Erstens die Internalisierung der Ökonomien, 
womit die Möglichkeiten weltweit zu verkaufen und zu produzieren gemeint sind, und 
zweitens bestimmte Markteigenschaften wie Netzwerkeffekte sowie Produktions-
bedingungen natürlicher Monopole. Wir fokussieren auf drei substantielle 
Problembereiche internationaler Fusionskontrolle: die Marktabgrenzung, die 
Einschätzung der Wettbewerbswirkungen und die Rolle von Abhilfemaßnahmen. Wir 
argumentieren, daß sich die Gefahren internationaler Konflikte sehr unterschiedlich 
über diese drei Bereiche verteilen. Insbesondere sind Konflikte über die Abgrenzung 
des relevanten Marktes weniger wahrscheinlich. Im Gegensatz hierzu sprechen eine 
Reihe von Gründen dafür, daß Konfliktsituationen sowohl bei der Einschätzung der 
Wettbewerbswirkungen von Fusionen als auch bei der Anwendung von 
Abhilfemaßnahmen wahrscheinlicher werden in New Economy-Märkten. 
 
 
iv 1. Introduction 
Terms like “new economy” or “globalization” have been used to describe a set of key 
developments beginning in the late 20
th century.  Amongst those are technological 
changes, as well as other policy measures (such as integration, deregulation, 
privatization, etc.), which increase competition at the international as well as national 
levels.  As a result of these major developments a number of fundamental changes are 
taking place, with important implications for the way we organize our education 
systems, labor markets, and the welfare state.   
 
One of the most important policy instruments affecting the way markets perform in the 
new economy is competition policy.  More specifically, this paper addresses the 
potential for conflict between antitrust authorities on the arena of merger control in the 
new economy.  At this point it might be useful to define what we mean be new 
economy in this context. By “new economy” we are concerned with two related 
developments. First, the internationalization of the economy, i.e. the ability to sell and 
produce products worldwide at low costs.  As a direct result, it is increasingly common 
for national business conduct to have anticompetitive consequences in other countries.  
We do not attempt to explain why this is the case, for instance through the availability 
of new technologies (like the internet) or a reduction in geographic entry barriers.  We 
simply take this for granted and explore its implications for international competition 
policy.  
 
Secondly, new economy involves markets where certain characteristics - which 
typically create market failures - are strongly at work.  These include network effects, 
both on the consumer side as well as on the firm side, which introduces standard setting, 
as well as the complicated issue of natural monopoly. Other aspects include the 
complementarity of products as well as the role of access to essential facilities. Again, 
we take these characteristics as given and explore the implications for international 
competition policy. 
 
For a number of reasons it appears that competition policy in international markets is 
likely to be at the forefront of important policy decisions. This is a result of the need to 
coordinate amongst nations whose companies are competing in similar and related 
markets.  An effective and transparent institutional environment to handle such conflicts 
is currently being debated by policy makers. We will elaborate on this point in the 
following section. 
 
There are other political and economic constraints that will raise the importance of 
international competition policy. “Globalization” implies competition among 
governments, as well as less independence for national policy. This is most apparent in 
the arena of taxation, where the interdependencies are increasing.  As a result, 
international competition policy is becoming more central for national governments, as 
other instruments may be less effective. Finally, the international rules that govern 
competition, access and entry bear serious consequences for the economies of 
1 developing countries
1. For all these reasons it appears that international competition 
policy will become an increasingly important dimension of the new economy.  
 
As the economy is becoming more international, it appears natural that the “rules that 
govern the competitive process” need to be international as well. This point has also 
been made strongly by antitrust agencies. According to the (former) U.S. Assistant 
Attorney General Joel Klein (2000), the advance of ''globalization'' in the years to come 
will only enhance the scope for conflict and further integration of antitrust proceedings 
across jurisdictions will be necessary. Similar remarks have been put forward by the EU 
Antitrust authorities. According to the EU Commissioner for Competition Policy Mario 
Monti, the increasing internationalization of the economy ''creates very important 
challenges to antitrust authorities around the world” (Monti, 2000, page 8). 
 
This paper assesses the potential for conflict in merger control between national (or 
regional) competition policy authorities. We focus on the arena of merger control, as 
this is the area of competition policy where the international dimension is the strongest. 
Indeed, close to two thirds of the EU-U.S. joint involvements in competition policy 
cases has been with regard to merger control. In addition, there have been a number of 
high-profile cases where there has been substantial disagreement between the U.S. and 
European antitrust authorities. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the conditions 
under which conflict in merger control is likely to emerge.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section will document some of the main 
trends in merger control. Section 3 summarizes the current institutional framework for 
handling international cases. Section 4 addresses the scope of conflict between 
competition policy agencies. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Trends and Issues 
Companies have reacted to the changes in the economy.  This has produced a large 
number of mergers and alliances, both at the national and international level.  Figure 1 
illustrates this trend as far as EU notification of mergers is concerned.  As can be seen 
the number of cases has increased from approx. 50 in the early 90’s to over 300 by the 
end of the 90’s. A similar picture emerges for the U.S., where the numbers of 
transactions filed under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act increased from 1,328 in 1991 to 
4938 in 2000.  Figure 2 shows all the M&A deals and their deal value for the U.S.  The 
numbers are very striking, in particular in the second half of the 90’s M&A activity has 
sharply risen towards the end of the 90’s. In fact, the increase in total value of the deals 
is even more pronounced.  As has been widely reported, merger activity for 2001 does 
not reflect the dramatic increases of the 90’s, even though the reduction in number of 
deals is more striking than in value. Overall, there is little doubt that merger activity has 
been increasing throughout the 90’s and will be at a significant level for some time to 
come. 
                                                 
1   For instance, South Africa has recently passed and implemented a new – and more effective- 
competition policy law.  The South African Government (center-left) believes that competition policy 
is an effective policy instrument to make sure that entry takes place, giving young South-Africans an 
opportunity to share economic development. 
2 Figures 1 and 2 go here! 
 
A second trend relates to cross-border mergers. Using data provided by the World 
Investment Report, Figure 3 plots the cross-border M&A activity for deals that are 
worth more than $1bn. It can be seen that the cross-border investment through those 
“Mega Mergers” has more than doubled in the last four years.  Even more striking is the 
increase in total value of those deals.  In 1988 and 1999 (the last year for which we have 
data) the value of Mega Mergers has gone up from just over $100bn to roughly $500bn. 
Figure 4 documents the percentage of Mega Mergers in all cross-border mergers.  As 
one can see, Mega Mergers in 1999 make up less than 2 percent in numbers, while their 
value represents approx. 70%. Overall, cross-border activity has been increasing 
significantly in the late 90’s and much of this cross-border activity takes place through 
Mega Mergers. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 go here! 
 
There is evidence that the merger wave is not equally strong across all sectors of the 
economy.  The claim that most mergers are in the sector of the economy that is loosely 
referred to as the “new economy” is somewhat difficult to support by data, since it is not 
easy to divide sectors into those that are in the new economy and those sectors that are 
old economy. Figure 5 shows the available EU data on sectors that have been subject to 
the highest merger activities for the running year 2000 as per October.  As can be seen, 
the data is only suggestive. However, the two-digit industries with the most number of 
mergers are Machinery and Computer Equipment and Business Services. Figure 6 takes 
a closer look at the Business Service industry, which indicates that most of the merger 
cases were within the Computer Programming sector (close to 1800 cases). Even though 
this evidence is rather sketchy, it may nevertheless give some support to the claim that 
merger activity in sectors often referred to as “new economy” is substantial.  
 
Figures 5 and 6 go here! 
 
In sum, there appear to be three major trends that emerge. Merger activity is substantial 
and has been increasing throughout the 90’s, there is a significant international 
dimension in competition policy cases, and a good number of mergers take place in 
sectors that can loosely be defined as new economy. 
 
The next section will briefly describe the types of initiatives for cooperation between 
antitrust agencies that have been put in place in the 90’s, as well as mention some of the 
current proposals that are being discussed.  
 
3. Cooperation and Convergence between Antitrust Authorities 
There have been a number of high profile merger cases, like Aerospatiale/de Havilland, 
Boeing/Mc Donnell-Douglas, Gencor/Lonrho, Exxon/Mobile, Worldcom/MCI, MCI 
WorldCom/Sprint, BT/AT&T, Air Liquide/BOC, AOL Time Warner and 
GE/Honeywell, which have recently underlined potential for close cooperation between 
countries (or perhaps lack thereof) in the implementation of antitrust rules. In fact, about 
3 half of the Commission’s recent in-depth type II merger cases have been dealt with in 
co-operation with U.S. competition agencies (Schaub 2000, pages 3-4). Even though 
there has rarely been an outright disagreement between antitrust agencies in terms of 
their final decision, there have been instances where the final outcomes of procedures 
have been different. In 1997, the merger between Mc Donnell-Douglas and Boeing led 
to an important conflict between U.S. and EU antitrust authorities, which spilled over to 
their political governments.  The merger was allowed by U.S. authorities at a time when 
EU authorities were expressing serious concerns.  The conflict escalated and a trade war 
was avoided at the last minute when the parties accepted to modify their operation to 
satisfy the demands of the EU.  More recently, the GE/Honeywell case has illustrated 
some difficulty in the convergence process between the U.S. authorities and the EU. 
The proposed concentration between two U.S. firms was blocked by the Commission, 
while it had been approved by the Department of Justice in the U.S. This was the first 
time that a U.S. merger involving domestic firms had been prevented by a non-U.S. 
authority, provoking harsh criticism from U.S. politicians, policy makers, as well as 
some academics. 
Antitrust authorities have responded to these developments by creating cooperative 
agreements or reforms directed towards the convergence on procedural as well as 
substantive issues. Early such attempts are the bilateral co-operation agreements, which 
are meant to reduce the scope for conflict by sharing information, coordinating 
procedures, and by efforts to converge on substantive issues. A prominent example is 
that of the agreement between the U.S. and the Commission, which was applicable as of 
1995
2. In the period 1995-1998, this Agreement gave rise to contacts on more than 200 
competition policy cases (Commission of the European Communities, 1999). In 
addition to the EU-U.S. Agreement, the EU has negotiated bilateral agreements with 
several other countries, such as Canada, Israel, Russia, and many other Central and 
Eastern European countries. An agreement with Japan is apparently close to conclusion. 
In terms of the EU-U.S. Agreement of 1991, it is noteworthy that a majority of these 
cases has been in the arena of merger control. Table 1 reports the number of 
notifications under the EU-U.S. Agreement. As can be seen, the number of cases has 
been substantially increased on the EU side, while notifications from the U.S. side has 
been stable. In particular, in terms of merger cases, EU notifications have increased 
from 11 cases in 1992 to some 59 cases in 1999. It appears from this data that the 
international side of competition policy is becoming more important throughout the 90s. 
 
 
                                                 
2   Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the 
European Communities regarding the application of their competition laws (OJ L 95, 27.4.95, pp. 47 
and 50). 
4 Table 1 
(Notified cases under the Agreement between the European Communities and the 
Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their 
competition laws) 
U.S. Notifications 
Year  EC 
Notifications  FTC DoJ 
Merger Notifications 
1992  26  20  20 (=40)  11 (EC) + 31 (US) 
1993  44  22  18 (=40)  20 (EC) + 20 (US) 
1994  29  16  19 (=35)  18 (EC) + 20 (US) 
1995  42  14  21 (=35)  31 (EC) + 18 (US) 
1996  48  20  18 (=38)  35 (EC) + 27 (US) 
1997  42  12  24 (=36)  30 (EC) + 20 (US) 
1998  52  22  24 (=46)  43 (EC) + 39 (US) 
1999  70  26  23 (=49)  59 (EC) + 39 (US) 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2000) 
 
Bilateral arrangements are now regarded as insufficient by both the U.S. and European 
antitrust authorities (see Monti 2000). To cope with the perceived need for increased 
international co-ordination in competition policy, the EU has generally followed a dual 
approach,  where both bilateral (like the EU-U.S. Agreement described above) are 
complemented by attempts to create an institutional framework for multilateral 
exchange on antitrust issues.  The former Assistant Attorney-General of the U.S. DoJ 
Joel Klein has stated that “bilateral co-operation is an essential template but by itself is 
insufficient to cope with present and future challenges posed by global mergers” (EC 
Competition Policy Newsletter, 2000, page 2).  
Even though many antitrust officials and academic (see Jacquemin et al. (1998), or 
Klodt (2001)) agree that a multilateral initiative is called for, there appears to be 
diverging views as to the appropriate institutional setting. While the EU has been 
proposing a Multilateral Framework Agreement on Competition Policy as part of the 
WTO
3, the U.S. side has favored the so-called Global Competition Initiative (GCI), 
which has been proposed by a U.S. advisory committee on international competition 
policy, called the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee ICPAC.  In 
particular, the ICPAC report concludes in its findings that “existing multilateral 
organizations are nor equipped to handle some competition conflicts between nations” 
(ICPAC, 2000, page 30).  Instead they propose a “less bureaucratic” light institutional 
structure – modeled after the G7 summit. While maintaining the multilateral fora as a 
long term endeavor, the EU side has also welcomed the GCI as a venue to discuss 
convergence and create a “common worldwide ‘competition culture’” (see Schaub 
(2001)). 
                                                 
3   Since 1996 there has been a WTO Competition Working Group as well as OECD working parties to 
discuss these issues.  
5 Besides international cooperative agreements and fora, there is another possibility to 
achieve greater convergence amongst antitrust authorities, namely the unilateral reform 
of merger guidelines. The EU has issued in December 2001 a “Green Paper on the 
Review of Council regulation No 4064/89” (Commission of the European Communities 
(2001)), which includes several potential changes to the merger guidelines. Besides a 
number of procedural and jurisdictional issues there are also substantive areas where 
convergence to the U.S. standard is envisaged. For instance, it has been alleged that the 
law concerning the substantive test leads to convergence problems between the EU and 
U.S. Another issue is that of the application of an efficiency defense, which is not 
actively used by the EU, contrary to the U.S. procedures. It should be emphasized that 
the Green Paper’s objectives go beyond the issue of convergence and that it remains to 
be seen what changes will ultimately survive.  
In general, cooperation amongst antitrust agencies can therefore be divided into two 
kinds of issues. First, there are sizeable procedural benefits such as sharing information, 
reducing the scope for misunderstandings, streamlining and simplifying filing 
requirements, etc.
4 Second there is convergence on substantive issues, which is perhaps 
the most difficult - yet important - issue in international antitrust. Given the different 
legal and institutional setting, there is definite scope for conflict such that convergence 
on substantive matters is of considerable importance. The next section will investigate 
whether the “new economy” enhances the likelihood of conflict in international 
antitrust.  
 
4. The Scope for Conflict in Merger Control 
We will now illustrate how the scope for conflict is affected in the new economy. In the 
following subsections we focus on the three main substantive issues in merger control:
5  
(4.1) market  definition 
(4.2)  assessment of competitive effects, and  
(4.3)  appropriateness of remedies.  
We will now address these three issues in more detail. The first subsection assumes that 
the agencies are following a simple consumer surplus standard and asks whether the 
scope of conflict is likely to increase when markets are becoming more international. It 
is important to emphasize that we assume that there is no disagreement on the 
assessment of dominance and that remedies play no role in this context. In other words 
we concentrate on the likely emergence of conflict regarding issue (4.1), i.e. the 
                                                 
4   According to the antitrust agencies the extensive and frequent interactions between the FTC and the 
DoJ on the one side and the DG Comp on the other, has led to substantial benefits since the 
Agreement came into force in 1995 (see for instance Schaub 2000, Monti 2000). 
5   These are also the three areas of cooperation mentioned in the EU-U.S. agreement discussed above. In 
October 1999, DG Comp, the FTC and the DOJ have decided to create a EU/U.S. Merger Working 
Group whose role is to enhance transatlantic cooperation in “global mergers” by considering issues 
(i)-(iii).  However, this attempt to achieve convergence is likely to be rather narrow and has so far 
reportedly only addressed issue (iii). 
6 definition of markets.  The following subsections will address the scope of conflict 
concerning issues (4.2) and (4.3).  
4.1 Conflict over Market Definition 
The presumption that the scope for conflict is (quantitatively) important and likely to 
increase in the future has so far not been supported by formal analysis (see Bacchetta et 
al. (1998)). Neven and Röller (2001a) attempt to provide the rudiments of such an 
analysis. They develop a model of international merger control and undertake a positive 
analysis of the scope for conflict
6.  
In particular, it is assumed that the objective of antitrust authorities is to defend 
consumers' interests. This assumption is a fair description of the objective, which is 
currently assigned to both U.S. and EU agencies in charge of merger control. For 
instance, Art. 2 of the merger regulation stipulates that the merger task force should be 
solely concerned about restrictions of competition and that efficiency benefits should 
only be taken into account in so far as consumers are not hurt. Hence, it would appear 
that the merger regulation is concerned with consumer surplus. The U.S. antitrust 
legislation has a similar focus on consumers (see e.g. Gellhorn and Kovacic (1994)). 
Such a narrow objective can also be rationalized in the presence of regulatory failures 
(see for instance Besanko and Spulber (1993) or Neven and Röller (2001b)).  
The second aspect of the model is that all countries affected by a merger will assert 
jurisdiction, and that each country has effectively a veto power on any proposed merger. 
This is in line which current practice, and has indeed been observed in several merger 
cases. 
Finally, the essential features of the procedure followed by the main antitrust agencies 
are introduced.  In particular, both the decision taken by the agencies on market 
definition (using the elasticity of demand), as well as the analysis of dominance through 
evaluation of market shares and treshholds are included.  
Given a particular distribution of mergers in terms of their sales across countries, Neven 
and Röller (2001a) then characterize both the scope and the type of conflict that may 
arise. It is shown that the scope for conflict in international merger control is rather 
limited. In particular, whenever national antitrust agencies define the global market as 
relevant, no conflict can ever emerge. In this sense, internationalization of the economy 
cannot explain why national agencies disagree. A second robust finding is that a 
positive correlation across jurisdictions in market shares of the merging parties lowers 
the potential for conflict. To the extent that market integration produces correlated 
market shares, a more integrated market is subject to less conflict between antitrust 
agencies. 
                                                 
6   A related question has been addressed by Neven and Röller (2000), where the question of allocation 
of jurisdiction is addressed.  In principle, the scope for conflict should be affected by the rules 
governing the assertion of jurisdictions. The paper concludes, using a formal analysis of merger 
control, that the allocation of jurisdiction matters surprisingly little for the outcome of merger control. 
That is, the circumstances where delegation to a single centralized authority would lead to a different 
outcome from the simultaneous assertion of jurisdiction may not be that frequent. 
7 Finally, it is shown that the difference in country size matters only when there is 
conflict over the relevant market, i.e. when one country defines the global market as 
relevant while the other country considers the national market as relevant. In those 
circumstances countries of unequal size have a lower probability of conflict. 
In sum, the above analysis makes a simple, but perhaps forceful point: since both 
correlated market shares and global market definitions are associated with an open and 
integrated economic area, it appears that the scope for conflict in international merger 
control is less likely to occur when economic integration is high. Those results can 
therefore be interpreted to suggest that ''globalization'' should not be seen as the source 
of conflict between national antitrust agencies, but should rather help alleviate such 
frictions.  
There are a number of important qualifications and implications to the previous 
argument. Recall that the above model assumes that national agencies follow their 
mandate and protect consumer interests. This may of course be an idealistic assumption 
in an international context. To the extent that national agencies are associated with the 
pursuit of other objectives, like the defense of national champions, the above conclusion 
would be invalid. In other words, conflict may emerge precisely because national 
agencies are not following their mandate. 
A second source of conflict may be that antitrust agencies are subject to influence 
activities by competing firms.  There is ample anecdotal evidence that lobbying by 
special interest is attempted.  Even though lobbying by firms in a merger case can be 
efficient (see Neven and Röller 2001b), it may also create incentives for an agency to 
discount consumer interest.  
4.2 Competitive Effects in the New Economy 
Recall that the above analysis abstracts from the other two substantive issues in merger 
control that agencies might disagree over: (4.2) the assessment of competitive effects, 
and (4.3) the appropriateness of remedies. This section addresses (4.2). We proceed in 
two steps. First, we briefly review the distinguishing characteristics of competition in 
new economy markets and, second, we discuss whether the scope for conflict between 
jurisdictions might widen in new economy-type markets.  
Distinguishing features of competition in new economy markets 
A central feature of the new economy is the presence of network effects.
7 While 
traditional analysis assumes that a product’s intrinsic value is the main source of benefit 
to consumers, network products create value by integrating products, businesses, and 
consumers into networks. In those networks, a single product or service has little or no 
value in isolation, but generates value when combined with others. More importantly, 
the benefit a user derives from consuming a network product increases with the number 
of total users of the same or compatible products. These “network effects” arise in 
                                                 
7   In the following we consider network effects as the most important feature of new economy markets. 
Seminal contributions to the economic analysis of network effects are Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) 
and Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986). Overviews over the relevant literature and related issues are 
provided by Liebowitz and Margolis (1999), Wey (1999), and Shapiro and Varian (2000). 
8 markets for operating systems and application software as well as in telephone and fax 
networks
8. While this phenomenon is not entirely new, the degree to which networks 
shape business strategies today has changed fundamentally.  
 
Other key characteristics of the new economy include the existence of strong 
complementarities between products. For instance, a computer operating system and its 
software applications are strong complements. Software production is also subject to 
significant economies of scale. For example, it is very costly to produce the first copy of 
an operating system but less and less to produce additional copies. In other words, the 
production technology is more likely to resemble that of a natural monopoly.  
 
These characteristics of the new economy have important implications for market 
structure and antitrust. Network effects, complementarities between products, and non-
convex costs give rise to “critical mass” and “chicken-and-egg” problems that lead to 
winner-takes-it-all outcomes. Whenever a product standard gains critical mass with a 
sufficient supply of complementary products, it will tend to be dominant.  On the other 
hand, a new product standard is doomed to fail, if adoption of the standard does not 
reach momentum and supply of complements is too low
9. For this reason markets with 
substantial network effects are rather different from more traditional markets as 
concentration is more likely to occur. 
 
The implication for antitrust is that consumers may be better of in concentrated markets. 
A monopolist may benefit consumers in network markets simply by internalizing the 
network effects and complementarities between products. In this sense, consumers have 
a preference for concentration, which merger control needs to account for when trading 
off the alleged abuses of dominance with the additional benefits accruing from larger 
network effects.  
 
There are, however, also factors that may hurt consumers. A crucial dimension of 
competition in the new economy is the existence of switching costs. Consumers need to 
invest in order to use a product (for example to learn how to use an operating system), 
which tends to create lock-in effects as well as the possibility of being orphaned with an 
inferior technology standard. Switching costs give rise to “installed base effects”, which 
can create entry barriers and first-mover advantages. That is, network effects may “tip” 
                                                 
8   Network effects are also present in other generic situation. For instance, when consumers buy durable 
hardware, each consumer forms expectations about the availability and variety of compatible software 
in the future. The larger the network of users of a particular software format, the higher the value 
consumers attach to the hardware that uses this format. This hardware/software paradigm (Katz and 
Shapiro (1985)) applies to many markets in the information economy: computer hardware and 
application software, credit-card networks, VCRs and video cassettes, etc. Network effects are also 
present the Internet sector. For instance, in the Worldcom/MCI case the U.S. and EU antitrust 
authorities found significant network effects in the market for top-level Internet services. 
9   This problem emerges regularly in the consumer electronics area. Video cassettes and VCRs are 
strong complements and are subject to network externalities: the demand for VCRs is positively 
correlated with the availability and variety of video cassettes and the demand for video cassettes 
depends on the installed base of VCRs of the same format. To market the VCR, consumers have to be 
convinced about the availability of video cassettes in the future. Integration is one way to overcome 
this coordination problem (example is Nintendo selling an entire system, consisting of a machine and 
proprietary games). 
9 markets very quickly in favor of a dominant incumbent and give rise to first-mover 
advantages. For example, network effects taken together with consumer lock-in may 
create entry barriers that protect a monopolist for a significant time span.  
 
Overall, this short characterization shows that the economic forces at work in the new 
economy differ significantly from those underlying the standard textbook model of 
markets. Network effects, product complementarities, and production economies give 
rise to winner-takes-it-all phenomena. As a result the economics of antitrust becomes 
more complicated and a simple “market-share” view of the world is less appropriate. 
The scope of conflict in the new economy 
While all these issues are not new, the significance of these effects is much larger in 
network markets than in old economy-type markets. Most importantly, a static market-
share model of competition is less relevant in many new economy mergers.  
 
As a result we believe that the scope for conflict over the assessment of competitive 
effects is likely to increase in new economy-type markets. There are several reasons for 
this. First, as we have argued above the assessment of the competitive effects involves 
trading off increases in concentration (as measured by market shares or Herfindahl 
indices) with possible benefits stemming from increased coordination, standardization 
and possible efficiency gains. Often these benefits to consumers are difficult to measure 
and relatively fewer simple rules through which they can be assessed are available. 
Antitrust agencies face considerable uncertainty and rather imprecise information 
regarding the technological environment and potential benefits to consumers. Given this 
difficulty in measurement there is ample scope to disagree in a particular case. 
Moreover, this is more likely to happen the larger the perceived benefits of monopoly 
are, i.e. precisely in those circumstances where new-economy characteristics are 
present.  
 
Second, we submit that the existing differences in competition laws between the U.S. 
and the EU are centered around the assessment of competitive effects (i.e. substantive 
issue (4.2)) as they relate to the characteristics of new economy-type markets. Take for 
instance the treatment of efficiencies. While the U.S. substantially revised its merger 
guidelines in 1997 to integrate efficiencies more fully into their merger review, the 
European Commission does not officially consider efficiency defenses
10. Given this 
difference it is perhaps more likely that conflict in those markets where the perceived 
efficiency gains are higher (i.e. new economy cases) is more likely to emerge. Another 
example is the substantive standards that are used by various antitrust agencies in 
merger cases. While U.S. merger control relies on the concept of substantial lessening 
competition (“the SLC-test”) the European Commission’s assessment is based on the 
concept of market dominance (“the MD-test”). Given these differences for assessing 
competitive effects, it seems likely that conflict in new economy markets increases. In 
                                                 
10  In the U.S. the efficiency defense enters merger control via the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
revised April 8, 1997. While the European Commission’s merger regulation does not suggest that 
efficiencies are irrelevant in merger control, there are indications that it is relatively reluctant to take 
them explicitly into account. For a comparison of both regulations see Röller et al. (2000), Venit and 
Kolasky (2000), and Bundeskartellamt (2001). 
10 fact the recent “Green Paper” by the European Commission on merger regulation 
(Commission of the European Communities (2001)) points precisely to those 
shortcomings and suggest a possible convergence with the U.S. practices as a way to 
convergence. 
 
A final source of conflict may arise when industrial (often national) economic interests 
are likely to play an important role. For instance, national interests may be strong when 
the creation of an international standard is at stake, as a substantial amount of rent can 
be shifted from one country to another
11. The presumption is that antitrust agencies are 
subject to influence activities not only by firms, but also by politicians (see for example 
the paper by Neven and Röller 2001b). In such a scenario industrial policy can create 
conflict between agencies. The likelihood of conflict therefore depends on the existence 
of such national rents, which is precisely the case in new economy-type markets.  
 
In sum, we find that the likelihood of conflict over the competitive effects of a merger is 
higher in situations characterized as new economy markets. We now turn to the issue of 
remedies where similar potential for conflict may emerge. 
4.3 The Role of Remedies in the New Economy 
A final area for possible conflict is remedies. A merger may be approved after 
appropriate remedies have been agreed upon. For instance, in network industries 
remedies often involve access to the merging firms network and - to a somewhat lesser 
extent - divestiture of parts of the merged entities assets. For instance, Shapiro (1999) 
reports on a number of U.S.-cases in which mergers in network industries were allowed 
under the condition that competitors gained access. In particular, the antitrust authority 
forced the merging parties to license critical parts of the “enabling” technology to one or 




Disagreement between antitrust agencies may thus emerge whenever the assessment 
concerning the appropriateness of the remedies differs. This in turn, depends very much 
on the analysis regarding the competitive effects of a merger as discussed in the 
previous sections. We therefore would expect that disagreement over remedies would 
emerge under the same conditions, i.e. when the static market-share model is least 
appropriate.   
 
In addition, it is worth emphasizing that remedies can also be subject to significant 
industrial policy concerns. Whenever a merging party needs to divest part of their 
                                                 
11   For instance, standard setting in high-definition television has been heavily influenced by national 
interests in order to protect home based consumer electronic industries (for the U.S. side, see Farrell 
and Shapiro (1992)). Similarly, recent standard setting in electronic payment systems and global 
navigation satellite systems also reveals the active role of national governments to promote domestic 
standards (see OECD (2000)). 
12  For instance, the WorldCom/MCI merger involving two U.S. telecommunications firms, where both 
the antitrust division of the Department of Justice and the European Commission were involved, 
resulted in the divestiture of MCI’s $1.75 billion in internet assets – the largest divestiture in U.S. 
merger history at that time (see DoJ (1999)). 
11 business, the question as to whom to sell to and at what price may involve some 
national interest politics. The strategic analysis of divestiture under antitrust pressures 
has not been formally analyzed, but aspects of rent-shifting are likely to play a key role 
here, which in turn can lead to conflict between national antitrust agencies.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the scope for conflict in merger control between competition policy 
authorities and whether the scope for conflict is likely to increase in the new economy. 
By new economy we mean to focus on two aspects: the internationalization of the 
economy and the increased importance of network technologies. Within this context we 
address three potential areas of substance: market definition, the assessment of 
competitive effects, and the appropriateness of remedies.  
 
With regard to the first issue, we have argued that the scope for conflict is lower in new 
economy-type markets. The intuition for this result is that antitrust agencies will come 
to similar conclusions about market definition whenever the economies are more 
integrated. In this sense, the emergence of the new economy should reduce the potential 
for conflict.  
 
Concerning the other two arenas, we find that conflict is more likely in new economy 
markets. The reasons are threefold: first the nature of competition in new economy-type 
markets makes the static market share model less appropriate, second the current merger 
control guidelines have not converged in important areas, and third incentives for taking 
influence (by firms and governments) are more likely in new economy markets.  
 
From this perspective the recently issued “Green Paper” on merger regulation and its 
focus on convergence appears to be more timely for markets which can be characterized 




Bacchetta, M., H. Horn and P. Mavroidis, (1998), “Do Negative Spillovers from 
Nationally Pursued Competition Policies Provide a Case for Multilateral 
Competition Rules”, in Ehlermann and Laudati (eds), European Competition 
Law Annual 1997: Objectives of Competition Policy, Hart Publishing, Oxford. 
Besanko, D. and D. Spulber, 1993, “Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust 
Policy”, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, 9,1-29. 
Bundeskartellamt (2001), “Das Untersagungskriterium in der Fusionskontrolle – 
Marktbeherrschende Stellung versus Substantial Lessening Competition”, Bonn. 
Commission of the European Communities (1999), Commission Report to the Council 
and the European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement Between the 
European Communities and the Government of the United States of America 
Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws 1 January 1998 to 31 
December 1998”, Brussels, April 1999. 
Commission of the European Communities (2000), Report from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement 
between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of 
America Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws 1 January 1999 
to 31 December 1999, Brussels, October 2000. 
Commission of the European Communities (2001), Green Paper on the Review of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, Brussels. 
DoJ (1999), Annual Report, FY 1999, Antitrust Division United States Department of 
Justice, Washington, D.C. 
EC Competition Policy Newsletter (2000), No. 3, October. 
Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. (1985), “Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation”, 
Rand Journal of Economics, 16, 70-83. 
Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. (1986), “Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, 
Product Preannouncements, and Predation”, American Economic Review, 76, 
940-955. 
Farrell, J. and Shapiro, C. (1992), “Standard Setting in High-Definition Television”, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, Brookings 
Institution, Washington, D.C. 
Gellhorn, E. and Kovacic, W. (1994), “Antitrust Law and Economics in a Nutshell”, 
West Publishing, St. Paul. 
International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (2000), Final Report to the 
Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust. 
13 Jacquemin, A., P.J. Lloyd, P.K.M. Tharakan and J. Waelbroeck, (1998), “Competition 
Policy in an International Setting: The Way Ahead”, The World Economy, 21 
(8), November. 
Klodt, H. (2001), “Conflicts and Conflict Resolution in International Anti-trust: Do We 
Need International Competition Rules?”, The World Economy, 24(7), July. 
Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C. (1985), “Network Externalities, Competition, and 
Compatibility”, American Economic Review, 75, 424-440. 
Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C. (1986), “Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network 
Externalities”, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 822-841. 
Klein, J., (2000), “Time for a Global Competition Initiative?”, Mimeo, Department of 
Justice, Washington D.C. 
Liebowitz, S. and Margolis, S. (1999), “Winners, Losers and Microsoft: Competition 
and Antitrust in High Technology”, Independent Institute, Oakland, CA. 
Monti, M. (2000), “European Competition Policy for the 21
st Century”, Speech to the 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New York, October 20
th, 2000. 
Neven, D. and L.-H. Röller, (2000), “The Allocation of Jurisdiction in International 
Antitrust”, European Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 44, 845-856. 
Neven, D. and L.-H. Röller, (2001a), “The Scope of Conflict in International Merger 
Control”, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2621, London. 
Neven, D. and L.-H. Röller, (2001b), “Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a 
Political Economy Model of Merger Control”, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 
2620, London. 
OECD (2000), OECD Information Technology Outlook 2000, Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. 
Röller, L.-H.; Stennek, J., and Verboven, F. (2000), Efficiency Gains from Mergers, 
European Economy, forthcoming. 
Schaub, A. (2000), “Assessing International Mergers: the Commission’s Approach”, 
speech at the EC Merger Control 10
th Anniversary Conference, Brussels. 14-15 
September 2000.  
Schaub, A. (2001), “The Global Competition Forum: How it should be organized and 
operated”, speech at the European Policy Centre, Brussels 14 March 2001. 
Shapiro, C. (1999), “Competition Policy in the Information Economy”, Mimeo, 
University of Berkeley. 
Shapiro, C. and Varian, H. R. (1999), “Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the 
Network Economy”, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Massachusetts. 
14 Venit, J.S. and Kolasky, W.J. (2000), “Substantive Convergence and Procedural 
Dissonance in Merger Review”, in S.J. Evenett, Lehmann, A. and Steil, B. (eds), 
Antitrust Goes Global: What Future for Transatlantic Cooperation, Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington, D.C. 
Wey, C. (1999), “Marktorganisation durch Standardisierung: Ein Beitrag zur Neuen 






































Number of notified cases Phase 1Figure 2
Source: www.mergerstat.com
Values calculated on the Base Equity price offered for all transactions in the Base.









































































































Value of Transaction Number of TransactionFigure 3
Source: World Investment Report 2000: Cross-border Merger and Acquisitions and Development, p. 108, tab. IV.2.























































number of deals Value (billion $)Figure 4
Source: World Investment Report 2000: Cross-border Merger and Acquisitions and Development, p. 108, tab. IV.2.



















percentage of total deals percentage of total valuesFigure 5
Quelle: European Economy, Supplement A Economic trends No. 5/6 - 2000, Mergers and Acquisitions, p. 15, gr. 11
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